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Unsportsmanlike Conduct – Calling a Penalty
on the NFLPA and NHLPA’s Duty of Fair
Representation for Entering Players
Ashton E. Stine
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2019 National Football League (“NFL”) season saw
Michael Thomas of the New Orleans Saints shatter the league’s
single-season receptions record.1 But a look at the situation that
transpired in the summer before this record-breaking campaign
shows how close it was to not happening.2 Thomas, like an
increasing number of young, superstar athletes, was unhappy
with the terms of his rookie contract3—a contract that was
provided to Thomas by the New Orleans Saints after he was
selected as the forty-seventh overall pick in the 2016 NFL Draft.4
Thomas’ initial deal with the Saints was predetermined by the
rookie compensation restrictions in the 2011 collective
bargaining agreement agreed upon by league owners and the
National Football League Players’ Association (“NFLPA”).5
As a second-round pick, Thomas was given a four-year, $5.1
million contract of which $2.6 million was guaranteed.6 After
being selected to the Pro Bowl following the 2017 and 2018
 J.D. Candidate 2021, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. I would
like to give special thanks for the expertise and kindness of my faculty advisor, Professor
Stephanie Lascelles. I also wish to thank my family and friends for putting up with my
incessant discussions of this topic and my obsession with sports in general. I could not
have accomplished this Article without their love, support, and encouragement.
1 See
NFL Single Season Leaders – Receptions, FOOTBALL DATABASE,
http://www.footballdb.com/leaders/season-receiving-receptions
[http://perma.cc/J42CTWUP] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
2 See Mike Triplett, Why the Saints had to break the bank for Michael Thomas,
ESPN (Jul. 31, 2019), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/27294194/why-saints-had-breakbank-michael-thomas [http://perma.cc/GL9Q-EZJV].
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See generally Nat’l Football League, Collective Bargaining Agreement 2011-2020, Art. 7,
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/2011%20CBA%20Updated%2
0with%20Side%20Letters%20thru%201-5-15.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3AJX-R4FV]
(last
visited May 3, 2020).
6 Michael
Thomas,
SPOTRAC,
http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/new-orleanssaints/michael-thomas-18996/ [http://perma.cc/7F78-V8Z8] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020)
(showing that, when broken down on a per-year basis, Thomas was earning an average
salary of $1,279,743 on his rookie contract).
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seasons, and being named a First-Team All-Pro in 20187, Thomas
was prepared to not report to Saints’ training camp in an attempt
to secure a better contract.8 Ultimately Thomas and the Saints
agreed on a five-year, $96.25 million contract extension—with a
touch over $35.6 million guaranteed—that allowed him to be in
training camp with his teammates in preparation for the 2019
season9, a season that saw Thomas ultimately put out one of the
most dominating performances by a wide receiver in NFL
history.
In just three years, Thomas had secured a deal worth over
fifteen times that of his restrictive rookie deal that was mandated
by the collective bargaining agreement. Was Thomas suddenly
fifteen times the player he was when he was drafted? Or was this
new deal a much more accurate reflection of Thomas’ correct
value? In an industry where the average career length is
measured in single-digit years and not decades, which dwarfs in
comparison to the time spent preparing to reach the pinnacle,
players must capitalize on their worth quickly.10
There are a select number of players who are able to
successfully negotiate a significantly more lucrative contract
without the threat of a holdout.11 Unfortunately, Thomas’ story is
quickly becoming the rule rather than the exception. A number of
NFL and National Hockey League (“NHL”) players nearing the
7 Michael
Thomas,
PRO
FOOTBALL
REF.,
http://www.pro-footballreference.com/players/T/ThomMi05.htm [http://perma.cc/LZE8-YM6V] (last visited Jan.
26, 2020).
8 See Jenna West, Michael Thomas Doesn’t Report to Saints’ Training Camp While
Seeking
New
Deal,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(July
25,
2019),
http://www.si.com/nfl/2019/07/25/michael-thomas-contract-saints-training-camp
[http://perma.cc/44TH-85XG].
9 See Mike Florio, Inside the Michael Thomas deal, NBC SPORTS (July 31, 2019,
8:27 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2019/07/31/inside-the-michael-thomas-deal/
[http://perma.cc/5V38-V7CG] (stating that, when broken down on a per-year basis,
Thomas’ new deal pays him an average base salary of $19.25 million per year).
10 See generally Heather Brown, Good Question: How Long Can Athletes Stay In The
Game?,
WCCO
CBS
MINNESOTA
(Feb.
8,
2016,
10:44
PM),
http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2016/02/08/good-question-how-long-can-athletes-stay-inthe-game/ [http://perma.cc/4N67-ULG6]; SI Wire, WSJ data analysis shows average
length of NFL careers decreasing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 1, 2016),
http://www.si.com/nfl/2016/03/01/nfl-careers-shortened-two-years-data-analysis
[http://perma.cc/E3XM-XBG3].
11 See Mike Florio, Inside the Christian McCaffery contract, NBC SPORTS (Apr. 16,
2020, 10:22 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2020/04/16/inside-the-christianmccaffrey-contract/ [http://perma.cc/36QZ-Y7Q7] (“McCaffrey got his new deal after only
three seasons, without a holdout or any other public ugliness. It’s a testament to Panthers
owner David Tepper, who recognized that McCaffrey is a high-talent, high-integrity core
player who will be part of the franchise’s nucleus for years to come.”); see also Sportsnet
Staff, Connor McDavid signs eight-year, $100M extension with Oilers, SPORTSNET (July 5,
2017, 3:06 PM), http://www.sportsnet.ca/hockey/nhl/connor-mcdavid-signs-eight-yearextension-oilers/ [http://perma.cc/6AQQ-3LBQ] (“McDavid . . . still has one year remaining
on his entry-level contract, so the extension doesn’t kick in until the 2018-19 season.”).
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end of their existing contracts are using the leverage that their
performances have created to secure themselves the money that
they rightfully deserve. Le’Veon Bell12, Ezekiel Elliott13, Melvin
Gordon14, Trent Williams15, and William Nylander16 are amongst
the most recent high-profile names that are dissatisfied enough
with their current contract situation to justify missing playing
time to seek out a new contract. The parameters restricting rookie
compensation in the NFL and NHL can and must be improved.
The NFLPA and The National Hockey League Players’ Association
(“NHLPA”)—the unions that represent these athletes in collective
bargaining negotiations with league management—must act with
the best interest of all their members in mind, not solely veteran
players.
Part II of this Article discusses the background and purpose of
collective bargaining in American professional sports, the
consequences of collective bargaining failure, and the results of
player dissatisfaction. Part III of this Article describes the
interconnected relationship between antitrust law and labor law
in sports and details a current problem in the collective bargaining
agreements of the NFL and the NHL—rookies are
disproportionately subjected to unduly restrictive contract
compensation as a result of bad faith negotiation by their
respective players’ associations, in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act. Part III continues with comparisons to past
collective bargaining agreements and shows how players have
responded to these restrictions by refusing to play under the
existing terms of their contracts and their justification for seeking
increased compensation. Finally, Part IV advocates for a proposal
that prohibits players’ associations from negotiating different
rights based on the time a player—or a class of players—has spent

12 See Danny Heifetz, Le’Veon Bell’s Holdout Feels Real This Time, RINGER (Sept. 5,
2018, 4:46 PM), http://www.theringer.com/nfl/2018/9/5/17824408/leveon-bell-holdoutcontract-franchise-tag-pittsburgh-steelers [http://perma.cc/KBG9-LPL4].
13 See Bill Williamson, All You Need To Know About The Ezekiel Elliott Holdout,
FORBES (Aug. 7, 2019, 7:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billwilliamson/2019/08/07/allyou-need-to-know-about-the-ezekiel-elliott-holdout/#6290f80471c2 [http://perma.cc/3MPY4ZJK].
14 See Dan Cancian, Melvin Gordon Holdout: Will Los Angeles Chargers Star Play This
Year?, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 3, 2019, 12:07 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/will-melvin-gordonplay-holdout-contract-los-angeles-chargers-1457433 [http://perma.cc/QJD9-WQBK].
15 See Ethan Cadeaux, A timeline of the Trent Williams holdout: how did we get
here?,
NBC
SPORTS
WASHINGTON
(Sept.
16,
2019,
11:18
AM),
http://www.nbcsports.com/washington/redskins/timeline-trent-williams-holdout-how-didwe-get-here [http://perma.cc/6YQ4-K5E5].
16 See Mike Johnston, Report: Rival NHL execs question Maple Leafs forward
Nylander’s
value,
SPORTSNET
(Oct.
19,
2018,
7:16
PM),
http://www.sportsnet.ca/hockey/nhl/report-rival-nhl-execs-question-maple-leafs-forwardnylanders-value/ [http://perma.cc/ZJN7-UKQD].
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in the league when negotiating future collective bargaining
agreements. Part IV draws comparisons to both sports and nonsports examples of players’ associations or unions not setting a
maximum amount that entering talent is able to earn and further
discusses the importance of implementing uniformity in the rights
afforded to players when negotiating with league ownership.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Origins of Collective Bargaining Agreements
Collective bargaining agreements are “document[s] by which a
labor union and an employer stipulate to the terms of employment
for those employees that are party to the collective bargaining
agreement which formulate the foundation for dealings between
players’ unions and league ownership”.17 Collective bargaining
agreements allow these unions—representing the players and their
interests—and employers—representing the team owners and their
interests—to negotiate and come to terms on crucial matters
affecting league play.18
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) was introduced
by Congress in 1935 “to protect the rights of employees and
employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail
certain private sector labor and management practices, which
can harm the general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S.
economy.”19 Section 9 of the NLRA provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.20

The NFLPA has been the unionized representative body of
football players in the NFL since 195621, although NFL club
owners did not recognize the union until 1968, when the first
collective bargaining agreement was entered into.22 The NHLPA

17 Blake Yagman, Weekly Legal Brief: Collective Bargaining, Lockouts, and Strikes,
FRONT OFFICE SPORTS (Apr. 27, 2018), http://www.frntofficesport.com/weekly-legal-briefcollective-bargaining-lockouts-and-strikes [http://perma.cc/68N5-8F8C].
18 Id.
19 National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/how-wework/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
20 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012).
21 About
the NFLPA, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nflpa.com/about
[http://perma.cc/33L5-U6S2] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).
22 NFL
labor
history
since
1968,
ESPN
(Mar.
3,
2011),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?page=nfl_labor_history [http://perma.cc/DB2X-78SG].
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was formed in 1967 and was recognized that same year by NHL
club owners.23 The first collective bargaining agreement between
the NHLPA and the NHL was reached in 1975.24 In the early
stages of the respective players’ associations, the collective
bargaining agreements between the sides were focused on “basic
economic rights.”25 It was not until the players garnered more
leverage vis-à-vis the owners that they began to redirect the
narrative and push for more in their collective bargaining
discussions, including securing a share of league revenues, and
other salary related issues.26
While labor negotiations between players’ unions and league
owners may appear to be identical to that of non-sports
industries, there are much deeper layers of factors to consider. 27
The sports industry combines an employee base that possesses a
unique set of skills with a monopolistic employer.28 There are
few, if any, substitute leagues for athletes that wish to ply their
trades at the highest level and thus they must subject
themselves to a lesser bargaining power vis-à-vis league
owners.29
B. Purpose of Collective Bargaining Agreements: Parity and
Control
Professional sports in North America are part of a large and
ever-growing industry.30 While millions of North Americans enjoy
sports on some level, team ownership is a privilege reserved for the
ultra-rich.31 The Dallas Cowboys, often regarded as the benchmark
franchise in North American sports, have a valuation of $5.5 billion
while the Buffalo Bills, the NFL franchise with the lowest valuation,
is still worth just south of $2 billion.32 The four major sports
leagues—the NFL, NHL, National Basketball Association (“NBA”),
23 Frequently Asked Questions, NHLPA, http://www.nhlpa.com/the-pa/what-wedo/faq [http://perma.cc/UF8F-H8LP] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
24 Id.
25 Gabe Feldman, Collective Bargaining in Professional Sports: The Duel Between
Players and Owners and Labor Law and Antitrust Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
AMERICAN SPORTS LAW 5 (Michael A. McCann ed., 2018).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 6.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Darren Heitner, Sports Industry To Reach $73.5 Billion By 2019, FORBES (Oct. 19,
2017, 7:15AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2015/10/19/sports-industry-toreach-73-5-billion-by-2019/#7e94448c1b4b [http://perma.cc/8AE2-U8SS].
31 See Michael Ozanian et al., The NFL’s Most Valuable Teams 2019: Cowboys Lead
League
at
$5.5
Billion,
FORBES
(Sept.
4,
2019,
7:25
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2019/09/04/the-nfls-most-valuable-teams-2019cowboys-lead-league-at-55-billion/#2b6b29212f1b [http://perma.cc/8FRJ-DY9Z].
32 See id.
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and Major League Baseball (“MLB”)—collectively recognized
approximately $31 billion dollars in revenue in their most recent
seasons.33 All thirty-two NFL teams experienced positive operating
incomes in 2019, with profits ranging from $28 million to $420
million.34 These revenue figures are driven by television deals,
advertisements, corporate sponsorships, gate revenues, and
merchandise sales.35
A vital consideration for these revenue drivers is the concept
of parity or “fairness in play.”36 “In order to be successful . . . the
public must believe that there is relative parity among the
member teams and that each team has the opportunity of
becoming a contender over a reasonable cycle of years . . . .”37
Aiming to meet these parity goals, league collective bargaining
agreements set forth and detail important competitive balance
measures such as: (1) draft selection order, (2) restriction on
player movement, and (3) salary control measures, or “salary
caps.”38
Most incoming players to the NFL and NHL enter through
the draft process. 39 It is through this process that organizations
are given the “exclusive rights” to secure the services of the
player.40 The NFL determines their draft selection order with a
true reversal of the standings from the previous year.41 The NHL
uses a lottery system where each non-playoff team has the
33 Devon Anderson, Ranking Professional Sports Leagues by Revenue, ULTIMATE
CORP. LEAGUE (Apr. 10, 2019), http://www.ultimatecorporateleague.com/rankingprofessional-sports-leagues-by-revenue/ [http://perma.cc/5BCB-XRPD].
34 See Ozanian, supra note 31, (showing that the Oakland Raiders realized $28
million in operating income from revenue of $357 million while the Dallas Cowboys
realized $420 million in operating income from revenue of $950 million).
35 See generally TJ Mathewson, TV is biggest driver in global sport league revenue,
GLOB.
SPORT
MATTERS
(Mar.
7,
2019),
http://globalsportmatters.com/business/2019/03/07/tv-is-biggest-driver-in-global-sportleague-revenue/ [http://perma.cc/8DJS-6B9B].
36 Duane W. Rockerbie, Exploring Interleague Parity in North America: The NBA
Anomaly, 17 J. OF SPORTS ECON. 286, 286 (2016).
37 Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 486
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
38 Collective Bargaining Agreements in Sports: How Do They Work in the United
States
vs.
Europe,
MONEY
SMART
ATHLETE
BLOG
(Aug.
29,
2018),
http://moneysmartathlete.com/2018/08/29/collective-bargaining-agreements-in-sportshow-do-they-work-in-the-united-states-vs-europe/ [http://perma.cc/8QCF-FVLU].
39 See Travis Lee, Competitive Balance in the National Football League After the
1993 Collective Bargaining Agreement, 11 J. SPORTS & ECON. 77, 78 (2010); see generally
Sam McCaig, From the draft to the NHL: A round-by-round look at the league’s skaters
and goalies, HOCKEY NEWS (Oct. 21, 2018), http://thehockeynews.com/news/article/fromthe-draft-to-the-nhl-a-round-by-round-look-at-the-leagues-skaters-and-goalies
[http://perma.cc/Y3Q3-J25V].
40 Lee, supra note 39.
41 The Rules of the Draft, NFL OPERATIONS, https://operations.nfl.com/journey-tothe-nfl/the-nfl-draft/the-rules-of-the-draft/
(last
visited
Nov.
3,
2019)
[http://perma.cc/TX63-92Z8].
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chance to select first in the draft, with the team that has the
worst record given the highest probability to earn the right to
select first.42 Both of these systems seek to provide the
least-successful teams in a given year with the opportunity to
turn their franchise fortunes around by selecting higher-rated
prospects that are available through the draft.
In an effort to allow teams to retain their top-tier talent and
remain competitive, collective bargaining agreements also
include restraints on player movement. In the early days of
sports, perpetual reserve clauses allowed teams to retain the
services of their players indefinitely until they were released
from their obligations by the team.43 In modern sports, where
perpetual reserve clauses have been abolished, players are under
club control for a set period of years before hitting “free agency.”44
It is at this point that a player can then decide on their own
where they wish to take their services.45 Many players elect to
spend their entire career with one organization, but many also
choose to explore the market and peddle their skills elsewhere
upon satisfying their obligations under their respective
contracts.46
In addition, league collective bargaining agreements also
implement a salary control tool that is more or less exclusive to
American sports: the salary cap. The NFL47 and NHL48 are both
governed by a “hard” salary cap, which operates by setting the
upper limit of player salaries that a team is permitted to spend in
a given league year.49 These salary control devices aim to foster
an environment of parity in American sports by preventing
teams with deeper pockets from monopolizing high-end talent in
the league, empowering franchises in smaller markets to obtain

42 See Adam Kimelman, 2019 NHL Draft Lottery Will Determine First Three Teams
to Pick, NHL (Apr. 8, 2019), http://www.nhl.com/news/2019-nhl-draft-lottery-faq/c306581364 [http://perma.cc/AY7U-RMLZ].
43 Jonathan B. Goldberg, Player Mobility in Professional Sports: From the Reserve
System to Free Agency, 15 S PORTS L. J. 21, 22–25 (2008).
44 Id. at 44.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 56–57.
47 Grant Gordon, NFL salary cap for 2019 season set at $188.2M, NFL (Mar. 1, 2019,
5:37 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000001020137/article/nfl-salary-cap-for2019-season-set-at-1882m [http://perma.cc/JJ85-LZNM] (“Officially, the salary cap for
2019 will be $188.2 million . . .”).
48 Dan Rosen, NHL announces salary cap for next season, NHL (June 22, 2019),
http://www.nhl.com/news/nhl-announces-salary-cap-for-2019-20-season/c-308008530
[http://perma.cc/GTH3-QQZ4] (“The NHL salary cap for the 2019-20 season will be $81.5
million . . .”).
49 Jim Pagels, Are Salary Caps for Professional Athletes Fair?, PRICEONOMICS (Aug.
19, 2014), http://www.priceonomics.com/are-salary-caps-for-professional-athletes-fair/
[http://perma.cc/MJP8-SFPG].
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player services, and allowing overall league prosperity by
encouraging reasonable competitiveness.50
The salary control exhibited in American sports can be
contrasted with the five major European soccer leagues: England’s
Premier League, Italy’s Serie A, Spain’s La Liga, Germany’s
Bundesliga, and France’s Ligue 1, which all lack a salary cap or
luxury tax structure, resulting in staggering salary inequality.51 In
2018, a survey examining salary inequality was conducted based on
the average first-team salaries of teams in major professional sports
leagues.52 From these salaries a fairness metric was created: a ratio
calculated by taking the average first-team salaries of the highest
spender in a respective league and dividing it by the amount spent by
the lowest spender.53
Of the eighteen leagues studied in the survey, the major
European soccer leagues occupied five of the seven lowest
rankings in salary inequality based on the fairness metric.54
American sports, with their salary caps and luxury tax
provisions, all ranked in the top half of fairness metric rankings
in that same study.55 If the raw “fairness metric” ratios are
compared, the gap is increasingly apparent: each North
American sport has a ratio of less than 4:1, while the Premier
League is the only European league with a ratio of less than
10:1.56 Each of the other four European leagues double the ratio
seen in the Premier League.57
It would appear that the strive for parity in American sports
through salary control devices has been largely successful. Of the
forty major American championships in the last decade, 70%
have been won by unique teams.58 In the major European soccer

50 What
is a Salary Cap in Sports?, UNIV. KAN. (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://onlinesportmanagement.ku.edu/community/salary-caps-in-sports,
[http://perma.cc/TN32-9E7H].
51 See generally Global Sports Salaries Survey 2018, SPORTING INTEL. (Nov. 25,
2018), http://www.globalsportssalaries.com/GSSS%202018.pdf [http://perma.cc/KQX9GCJ7].
52 Id. at 8.
53 Id.
54 See infra Appendix A.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See generally NBA & ABA Champions, BASKETBALL REF., http://www.basketballreference.com/playoffs/ [http://perma.cc/2SY6-CRR5] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019);
NHL/WHA
Playoffs,
HOCKEY
REF.,
http://www.hockey-reference.com/playoffs/
[http://perma.cc/U9EP-LN9V] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); Pro Football & NFL History, PRO
FOOTBALL REF., http://www.pro-football-reference.com/years/ [http://perma.cc/K6HWRHWT] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); World Series and MLB Playoffs, BASEBALL REF.,
http://www.baseball-reference.com/postseason/ [http://perma.cc/QZ92-JR72] (last visited
Nov. 3, 2019) (calculations conducted by author and correct as of May 18, 2020).
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leagues that lack the competitive balance measures of American
sports, that number drops to 34%.59
C. Consequences of Collective Bargaining Failures and
Dissatisfaction
1. Lockouts/Strikes
Ultimately, the role of a collective bargaining agreement is to
get the players out onto the field, ice, or court. Due to the
high-risk nature of professional sports competition and the large
considerations involved in each league’s collective bargaining
agreement, negotiations can be hostile and lead to lockouts
instituted by owners or strikes instituted by players’ unions.60
The most notable lockout from a fan and media perspective was
the 2011 NFL lockout, which lasted from March 12, 2011 until
August 4, 2011 and garnered around-the-clock coverage on major
sports news outlets.61 The NBA experienced a 161-day work
stoppage during roughly that same time period when the owners
locked the players out from July 1, 2011 to December 8, 2011.62
In August of 1994, MLB players instituted a strike mid-season
that caused the loss of over 900 scheduled games—including the
entirety of the 1994 playoffs.63 The strike was eventually resolved in
April of the following year after 232 days of labor tensions.64 The
NHL is infamously known as the only North American professional
sports league to forego an entire season due to a labor dispute.65 The
NHL lost the 2004–2005 season to a lockout before the NHL and the
National Hockey League Players’ Association (“NHLPA”) finally

59 See
generally
Bundesliga
Seasons,
FB
REF,
http://www.fbref.com/en/comps/20/history/Bundesliga-Seasons [http://perma.cc/F7RC-RTMB]
(last
visited
Nov.
3,
2019);
La
Liga
Seasons,
FB
REF,
http://www.fbref.com/en/comps/12/history/La-Liga-Seasons [http://perma.cc/7CYU-3HD2] (last
visited
Nov.
3,
2019);
Ligue
1
Seasons,
FB
REF,
http://www.fbref.com/en/comps/13/history/Ligue-1-Seasons [http://perma.cc/74XJ-NHGZ] (last
visited
Nov.
3,
2019);
Premier
League
Seasons,
FB
REF,
http://www.fbref.com/en/comps/9/history/Premier-League-Seasons
[http://perma.cc/Y3RPMR56]
(last
visited
Nov.
3,
2019);
Serie
A
Seasons,
FB
REF,
http://www.fbref.com/en/comps/11/history/Serie-A-Seasons [http://perma.cc/X7KJ-AYX3] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2019) (calculations conducted by author).
60 See Alex Remington, Lockouts, Strikes, And Labor Politics In Pro Sports,
FOOTNOTE (June 5, 2013), http://footnote.co/lockouts-strikes-and-labor-politics-in-prosports/ [http://perma.cc/7C9D-VL76].
61 See generally CNN Library, Pro Sports Lockouts and Strikes Fast Facts, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/us/pro-sports-lockouts-and-strikes-fast-facts/index.html
[http://perma.cc/P7UJ-RZA3] (last updated June 4, 2020, 1:18 PM).
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.
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agreed to a six-year collective bargaining agreement in July of 2005.66
After extending the agreement for one additional season, the NHL
owners again locked out the players in September of 2012, causing
the truncation of the 2012–2013 NHL season.67
2. Player Dissatisfaction–The Holdout
Unfortunately for owners, players, and fans of sports, a
ratified collective bargaining agreement does not ensure
harmony for the duration of the agreement. Players who are
unsatisfied with their contract terms (e.g., contract length, base
salary, performance incentive bonuses, or guaranteed money)
often holdout for a more lucrative contract.68 A “holdout” is sports
industry terminology for a player’s refusal to continue playing
under the terms of a previously agreed-upon deal.69 Holdouts are
becoming increasingly common in professional sports and
ultimately impact not only the team that is losing the services of
a player, but also the perception of the team and league in the
eyes of sponsors, advertisers, and fans.70
In addition to the competitive balance and overall salary
restraints detailed above, recent collective bargaining
agreements have implemented additional provisions that put
restrictions on the negotiable terms in rookie contracts.71 The
restrictions include detailing and limiting the maximum salary
payable under a rookie contract, fixing the length of years that a
player must sign for under their first contract, and providing
movement restrictions following the end of that first contract.72
With the average career length varying from “three to five years,”
players realize that there is a sense of urgency to earn their fair
share during the very brief window they have before injuries
inevitably take a toll.73 As a result of this short earning potential,

See id.
See id.
68 See
Jack Bechta, Why Players Hold Out, NAT’L FOOTBALL POST,
http://nationalfootballpost.com/why-players-hold-out/ [http://perma.cc/DL4C-N68H] (last
visited Mar. 6, 2020).
69 Jacob Salow, Holdouts, Lockouts, and Payouts: The National Football League’s
Bargaining Power Phenomenon, 43 L. & PSYCH. REV. 239, 240 (2019).
70 Peter B. Kupelian & Brian R. Salliotte, The Use of Mediation for Resolving Salary
Disputes in Sports, 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 383, 391 (1999).
71 See Blake Yagman, The Weekly Legal Brief: Breaking Down NFL Rookie
Contracts, FRONT OFFICE SPORTS (May 4, 2018), http://www.frntofficesport.com/theweekly-legal-brief-breaking-down-nfl-rookie-contracts/ [http://perma.cc/PEB9-Y3DX].
72 See generally Nat’l Football League, supra note 5; Nat’l Hockey League, Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
2012–2022
at
Art.
9,
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/CBA2012/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf
[http://perma.cc/PQ5N-KV87] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
73 Brown, supra note 10; see also Dave Siebert, M.D., The Impact of Modern Medicine
on the NFL, BLEACHER REP. (May 16, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/163984866
67
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a “majority of holdouts” occur when players are in the later
stages of their rookie, or entry-level, contracts.74 These players
are on team-friendly deals by virtue of being locked into the
restrictive terms set by the collective bargaining agreements of
the NFL and NHL.75 Oftentimes the teams wish to keep the
player for longer but are in no rush to sign the player prior to
their deal ending and while the player is under team control on
less-expensive contracts.76
D. NFL and NHL Collective Bargaining History
Before one can understand the gravity and significance of
the terms and conditions of the current collective bargaining
agreements in the NFL and NHL, it is important to take a brief
look back at past agreements that have been negotiated between
ownership and players’ associations. These agreements have
paved the way for the current collective bargaining relationship
between players’ associations and ownership and provide
valuable insight into the circumstances that led to the current
agreements.
1. Past NFL Collective Bargaining Agreements
Although collective bargaining in the NFL has been around
since 196877, it was the 1993 agreement that was heralded as “a
groundbreaking CBA that set the framework for every NFL CBA
since.”78 The success of the 1993 CBA was evident when that
agreement was extended three times—in 1998, 2001, and
2006—without any strikes, lockouts, or litigation between the
parties ensuing.79 The latest renewal of the 1993 CBA saw the
agreement last until 2011, at which point the NFL and NFLPA
went back to the bargaining table and, eventually, the
courtroom.80

projecting-the-impact-of-advancing-modern-medicine-on-the-nfl
[http://perma.cc/2K8JCML6] (noting the progress that modern medicine has made regarding injury research in
sports and stating that “[t]he medical community now knows that concussions carry not
only short-term, but also long-term, consequences. The age of ‘shaking off’ a blow to the
head is forever over.”).
74 Jason Fitzgerald, Looking at the NFL Training Camp Holdouts, OVER CAP (July
29, 2019), http://www.overthecap.com/nfl-training-camp-holdouts/ [http://perma.cc/3K7L72KH].
75 See Yagman, supra note 71.
76 See Fitzgerald, supra note 74.
77 See NFL labor history since 1968, supra note 22.
78 Chris Deubert, et al., All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and Analysis of the 2011
Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football League, 19 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 1, 12 (2012).
79 See id. at 13.
80 See id. at 14.
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The rookie compensation scheme that we see today was a
contentious issue in the 2011 negotiations.81 Teams had begun
choosing to give high-profile rookie players significant amounts of
money82, money that some felt was out of balance, believing that
the money should instead be used to pay proven veterans.83
2. Past NHL Collective Bargaining Agreements
The 1995 NHL collective bargaining agreement (“1995 CBA”)
was the first to implement a cap on entry-level players or, as the
agreement referred to them, “Group I players.”84 The 1995 CBA
placed a prescribed contract length based on the age a player was
when they signed their entry-level contract.85 Players between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one were signed for a period of
three years; players between the ages of twenty-two and
twenty-three were signed for a period of two years; players that
were twenty-four were signed for a period of one year, and there
was no required number of years for players aged twenty-five or
older, and those players were not in the entry-level system.86
The 1995 CBA also delineated the maximum NHL
compensation that a player could earn that was contingent on
the year they were drafted into the NHL.87 The amount of any
“signing, reporting and roster bonuses” was limited to no more
than 50% of the maximum compensation allowed under Section
9.3(a).88 Although the imposition of a salary cap on entry-level
players was a “supposed major victor[y] for the league,”89 a
loophole existed that was exploited by savvy player agents. 90
Article 9.3(c) of the agreement stated that “nothing contained in
this Section 9.3 shall be deemed to limit the amount permitted to
be paid to any Group I Player in respect of any Exhibit 5

See id. at 53.
Rams give Bradford 50M guaranteed, ESPN (July 31, 2010, 9:09 AM),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=5425041 [http://perma.cc/SD89-TYJL].
83 See Mawae: Big Rookie Contracts Like Ryans’ ‘Disheartening’, ESPN (May 21,
2008, 4:43 PM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3406508 [http://perma.cc/4HMQE8D3].
84 See James Wilton Baillie, An Examination of the Causes behind the Escalation of
Player Compensation Between 1994 and 2004 Leading to the 2004–05 NHL Lockout,
QUEEN’S UNIV. INDUS. REL. CTR., 33 (August 2005), https://irc.queensu.ca/wpcontent/uploads/articles/articles_investigation-into-the-collective-bargaining-relationshipbetween-nhl-nhlpa-1994-2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/GPQ2-V6LQ].
85 See Nat’l Hockey League, Collective Bargaining Agreement 1995–2004 at art.
9.1(b),
(Jan.
13,
1995)
http://www.letsgopens.com/nhl_cba-old.php?id=1
[http://perma.cc/5FJU-ZWTX].
86 See id.
87 See infra Appendix B.
88 Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 85 art. 9.3(b).
89 Baillie, supra note 84, at 33.
90 Id. at 34.
81
82
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Performance Bonus(es).”91 Among other things, Exhibit 5 allowed
bonuses for meeting performance metrics such as ice time, goals
scored, assists scored, and points scored.92
After a lockout caused the loss of the 2004–2005 NHL
season, the NHL and NHLPA agreed on the 2005 collective
bargaining agreement (“2005 CBA”).93 Most notably, the 2005
CBA was the first NHL CBA to include an overall salary cap on
team salaries.94 Like the 1995 CBA, the 2005 CBA also included
the same prescribed length for entry-level contracts95 and an
entry-level compensation maximum based on the year in which
the player was drafted,96 although the compensation figure was
scaled down dramatically from 1995 CBA figures.97 A notable
difference in the 2005 CBA was a stricter limitation on the
signing and games-played bonus: Section 9.3(b) removed the
reporting and roster bonuses, allowed entry-level players to only
earn a signing and games-played bonus, and capped said bonuses
at 10% of the player’s Section 9.3(a) compensation.98
III. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: BAD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS
DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT ROOKIES
A.

Labor Law and Antitrust Exemptions in Sports
Antitrust law and collective bargaining—through federal
labor law—are concepts that are in direct conflict with one
another.99 Simply put, “antitrust law promotes competition while
labor law endorses activities that restrict it.”100 The Sherman
Act, the main federal antitrust statute states: “Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is
declared to be illegal.”101 The NFL and NHL—and other North

Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 85, at art. 9.3(c).
See id. at Exhibit 5.
93 See generally CNN Library, supra note 61.
94 See Nat’l Hockey League, Collective Bargaining Agreement 2005–12 at art.
50.5(b),
(July
22,
2005),
http://www.letsgopens.com/NHL-2005-CBA.pdf
[http://perma.cc/S7M2-JF2A].
95 Id. at art. 9.1(b).
96 See infra Appendix C.
97 Compare infra Appendix B with Appendix C.
98 See Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 94, at art 9.3(a)–(b). This number was down
from the 50% allowable under the 1995 CBA.
99 See Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
100 Antitrust Law – Nonstatutory Labor Exemption – Second Circuit Exempts NFL
Eligibility Rules from Antitrust Scrutiny – Clarett v. National Football League, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1379, 1379 (2005).
101 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
91
92
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American sports leagues—are, by their very nature, violations of
antitrust laws.102 The teams in these leagues “must cooperate on
a business level to maintain competitive balance between them
[and b]y cooperating economically instead of competing with one
another, clubs are apparently violating antitrust laws.”103 This
dichotomy has been addressed and minimized in two ways: the
“statutory labor exemption”—codified as the Norris LaGuardia
Act and Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act—and the “nonstatutory labor exemption.”104
In Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, the Supreme Court interpreted
the statutory labor exemption statutes to mean that “labor
unions are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
and exempt[s] specific union activities . . . from the operation of
the antitrust laws.”105 The non-statutory labor exemption was
first explored in the sports capacity in Mackey v. National
Football League.106 In Mackey, NFL players brought an antitrust
challenge against the so-called Rozelle Rule, which permitted the
Commissioner of the NFL to compensate a team losing the
services of a player that was previously under contract with the
said team by “nam[ing] and then award[ing] to the former club
one or more players . . . of the acquiring club as the
Commissioner in his sole discretion deem[ed] fair and
equitable.”107 The Rozelle Rule was instituted not through
collective bargaining, but was instead adopted by league owners
as a unilateral amendment to the NFL Constitution.108
The Mackey court described the appropriateness of the
non-statutory labor exemption by developing a three-prong
test.109 In order for the non-statutory labor exemption to apply,
the restraint must (1) primarily affect only the parties to the
collective bargaining agreement, (2) be a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, and (3) be the product of bona fide arm’s
length bargaining.110 The court ruled that the Rozelle Rule met
prongs one and two of the non-statutory exemption test, but
failed on prong three as the court found the Rozelle Rule was not

102 See Leah Farzin, On the Antitrust Exemption for Professional Sports in the United
States and Europe, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L. J. 75, 75 (2015).
103 Id.
104 Feldman, supra note 25, at 8.
105 Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
106 Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
107 Id. at 610–11.
108 Id. at 610.
109 Id. at 614.
110 Id.
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the product of arm’s length negotiation.111 In its opinion, the
court stated that the Rule was unilaterally implemented by team
owners prior to any collective bargaining agreement between
league ownership and the players’ union and found that there
was a lack of sufficient evidence that the union had received
reciprocal consideration.112 Following the Eighth Circuit, a
number of lower district courts and sister circuit courts adopted
the Mackey test as the barometer for the non-statutory labor
exemption.113
The Supreme Court took up the non-statutory labor
exemption in the sports context in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., and
closed up the holes that the statutory labor exemption did not
immediately address.114 Brown involved a challenge to the NFL’s
creation of a “developmental squad” of players that “would play in
practice games and sometimes in regular games as substitutes for
injured players.”115 When the players’ association and the NFL
could not agree on the wages and benefits of the development
squad, the league unilaterally implemented the last best
proposal.116 In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Breyer
succinctly stated the aim and purpose of the non-statutory labor
exemption, stating:
As a matter of logic, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to require
groups of employers and employees to bargain together, but at the
same time to forbid them to make among themselves or with each
other any of the competition-restricting agreements potentially
necessary to make the process work or its results mutually acceptable.
Thus, the implicit exemption recognized that, to give effect to federal
labor laws and policies and to allow meaningful collective bargaining
to take place some restraints on competition imposed through the
bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions.117

A particularly noteworthy sports antitrust case is
Clarett v. National Football League, wherein Maurice Clarett, a
former standout running back at Ohio State University,
challenged the NFL’s draft eligibility rules that required hopeful
NFL players to wait three full football seasons after high school
graduation before the player would be eligible to enter the NFL
Id. at 615–16.
Id. at 616.
See, e.g., Bridgeman v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J.
1987); Cont’l Mar., Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th
Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979); Wood v.
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Zimmerman v. Nat’l
Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403–04 (D.D.C. 1986).
114 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
115 Id. at 234.
116 Id. at 235.
117 Id. at 237 (emphasis in original).
111
112
113
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Draft.118 Clarett was the first freshman to be listed as the
starting running back for Ohio State since 1943, and he did not
disappoint as he led the Buckeyes to a national championship
that season.119 Unfortunately for Clarett, that is where the
positives stopped. Clarett was accused of receiving “preferential
treatment” from Ohio State administrators,120 “charged with
misdemeanor falsification” of a police report,121 and eventually
suspended by Ohio State and the NCAA for accepting improper
benefits before he played a single snap in his sophomore
season.122
After his troubles at Ohio State, Clarett sought to enter the
2004 NFL Draft despite the NFL’s three-year rule.123 Clarett,
who had graduated from high school in December 2001124, posited
that NFL teams were “horizontal competitors for the labor of
professional football players and thus may not agree that a
player will be hired only after three full football seasons . . . .”125
In overturning the district court, the Second Circuit ruled that
that the non-statutory labor exemption applied and that Clarett
did not have antitrust standing to bring his claim, as doing so
would usurp federal labor law policies.126 Clarett’s writ of
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court127, and he was
barred from entering the 2004 NFL Draft.128 After he was forced
to take a year off from football, Clarett eventually entered the
2005 NFL Draft where he was drafted 101st overall by the

Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 126.
120 See Timeline: The rise and fall of Maurice Clarett, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2006),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2545204 [http://perma.cc/QSH4-LK8C] (quoting a
teaching assistant at Ohio State, who said Clarett “walked out of a midterm exam but
passed the class after the professor gave him an oral exam.”).
121 See id. (stating that, in July of 2003, Clarett had claimed that “more than $10,000
in clothing, CDs, cash and stereo equipment was stolen in April” from a car Clarett had
“borrowed from a local dealership.” Less than two month later, he was facing charges for
falsifying information.).
122 See id. (explaining that Ohio State athletic director Andy Geiger suspended
Clarett one day after Clarett was charged by police, claiming that Clarett had “received
special benefits worth thousands of dollars from a family friend and repeatedly misled
investigators).
123 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 130.
126 Id. at 143.
127 Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961
(2005).
128 In what can be described as adding insult to injury, when the 2011 NFL/NFLPA
CBA was passed, Article 6, Section 2(b)–the provision which dealt with the three-year
draft eligibility rule–gave an example to illustrate the rule with pointed similarities to
Clarett’s situation: “For example, if a player graduated from high school in December
2011, he would not be permitted to apply for special eligibility, and would not otherwise
be eligible for selection, until the 2015 Draft.” Nat’l Football League, supra note 5, at 17.
118
119
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Denver Broncos.129 Clarett was cut by the Broncos before ever
playing a snap in the NFL.130
The Clarett case provides some rather pivotal language
regarding prospective rookie players entering the NFL. Clarett had
argued that the rules governing eligibility for prospective players
were “an impermissible bargaining subject” due to their impact on
those who had not been parties to the agreement, i.e. those college
football players that were otherwise not members of the NFLPA.131
In ruling on the eligibility rules, the court stated: “prospective
players no longer have the right to negotiate directly with the NFL
teams over the terms and conditions of their employment. That
responsibility is instead committed to the NFL and the players
union to accomplish through the collective bargaining process.”132 It
is well settled that once a group of employees has unionized and
selected an exclusive bargaining representative, negotiation
privileges lie with the union and not with individual players.133
However, the Second Circuit appears to be misconstruing the
NFLPA’s representation of the prospective players’ interests.134
The preamble to the NFL/NFLPA collective bargaining
agreement states that the agreement is between the “National
Football League Management Council which is recognized as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and
future employer member Clubs of the National Football League”
and the “[NFLPA].”135 The NFLPA is the:
Sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future
employee players in the NFL in a bargaining unit described as follows:
1. All professional football players employed by a member club of the
National Football League;
2. All professional football players who have been previously employed
by a member club of the National Football League who are seeking
employment with an NFL Club;

129 See
2005
Denver
Broncos
Draft,
FOOTBALL
DATABASE,
http://www.footballdb.com/teams/nfl/denver-broncos/draft/2005
[http://perma.cc/3DVF5QQA] (last visited Apr. 3, 2020).
130 See John Clayton, Broncos to release Maurice Clarett, ESPN (Aug. 28, 2005),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2145372 [http://perma.cc/7TZZ-SK8B].
131 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140.
132 Id. at 138.
133 See National Labor Relations Act, supra note 19.
134 See Matthew Strauser, Upon Further Review: Reconsidering Clarett and Player
Access to the NFL, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 247, 250 (2018).
135 Nat’l Football
League, Collective Bargaining Agreement 2020 at xvi,
http://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFLNFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf [http://perma.cc/888P-B2GN] (last visited Mar. 25,
2020).
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3. All rookie players once they are selected in the current year’s NFL
College Draft; and
4. All undrafted rookie players once they commence negotiation with
an NFL Club concerning employment as a player.136

The plain language of the collective bargaining agreement
negotiated and entered into by NFL Management Council and
the NFLPA appears to explicitly exclude college players—or any
other prospective player seeking to enter the league—from
membership in the players’ association until after they are
selected in the “College Draft”137 or until they begin negotiations
with a team following the draft.138 This notion is confirmed by an
NFL player agent who states that “incoming [NFL] players aren’t
technically considered a part of the union.”139 On the other hand,
the NHL/NHLPA CBA preamble states that the agreement is
“between the National Hockey League . . . which is recognized as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the present
and future Clubs of the NHL, and the National Hockey League
Players’ Association . . . recognized as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of present and future Players in the
NHL.”140
Retired players are on the reciprocal end of the playing
spectrum from rookies, and it has been said that “the NFLPA
negotiates with the League on behalf of the active players, and
the interests of the active players . . . are not consistent with that
of the retired players insofar as the League offers a single
compensation pie to the players, such that any slice allocated to
the retired players results in a smaller slice for the active
players.”141 Here, a direct comparison can be drawn between the
interests of the active players and retired players not having
their interests aligned and veteran (active) players not having
their interests aligned with entering rookie players, in the same
sense that any slice allocated to the rookies results in a smaller
slice for the veteran players.

Id. (emphasis added).
See id. The NFL-NFLPA CBA uses the phrase “College Draft” to mean the draft
that a vast majority of players use as their method to enter the league, see discussion in
Part II infra.
138 See id.
139 Joel Corry, Agent’s Take: Fixing the rookie wage scale, plus a look at its history
and
how
it
works,
CBS
SPORTS
(Apr.
24,
2019,
3:02
PM),
http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/agents-take-fixing-the-rookie-wage-scale-plus-a-lookat-its-history-and-how-it-works [http://perma.cc/T5HU-WU4Z].
140 Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 72, at 1.
141 Eller v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 872 F. Supp. 2d 823, 834 (D. Minn.
2012).
136
137
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The statutory and non-statutory labor exceptions provide us
with a glimpse of the preference that labor law, via collective
bargaining, is given over antitrust law when the two are at odds,
especially in the sports context.142 This deferment to labor law
has been shown in numerous sports cases where courts have
been reluctant to rule in favor of plaintiff-athletes’ antitrust
claims, instead opining that such claims are better left to the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board as provided by
federal labor law.143 These decisions are “rooted in the
observation that the relationships among the defendant sports
leagues and their players were governed by collective bargaining
agreements and thus were subject to the carefully structured
regime established by federal labor laws.”144
B.

Current Collective Bargaining Agreements
With an understanding of applicable antitrust and labor
laws, it is time to turn to the current collective bargaining
agreements that govern the NFL and NHL today and examine
how they limit rookie athletes seeking to enter the league. While
the overarching goals are the same—establishing a framework
that details the terms and conditions of employment—collective
bargaining agreements in sports are as unique as the leagues
themselves.145 MLB players are not permitted to engage in pro
boxing, but receive their own room on the road.146 NHL players
must have established significant service time to receive their
own room, but receive six months of mortgage or rent coverage if
they are traded.147 NBA players only receive three months
coverage if they are traded, but receive extra-long beds and
porter baggage service on the road.148 NFL players can be fined
twice a week for being overweight, but cannot be disciplined for
hair preferences.149 A main point of difference in league collective
bargaining agreements deals with the terms surrounding the
rookie, or entry-level, contract.150
Feldman, supra note 25, at 9.
See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting “the
soup-to-nuts” array of rules and remedies afforded under the labor laws).
144 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135.
145 See Eric Macramalla, Part 4 in A Series Comparing the CBAs: Weird & Quirky
Clauses,
OFFSIDE
SPORTS
L.
(Jan
31,
2011,
10:59
AM),
http://offsidesportsblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/part-4-in-series-comparing-cbas-weird.html
[http://perma.cc/4UH4-55ND].
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See generally Andrew Brandt, The Differences in Rookie Contracts, NAT’L
FOOTBALL
POST,
http://nationalfootballpost.com/the-differences-in-rookie-contracts/
[http://perma.cc/WJR9-CDRA] (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
142
143
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1. NFL/NFLPA
The NFLPA and NFL owners reached a new collective
bargaining agreement on March 15, 2020.151 This new agreement
comes with one year remaining on the previous deal that was
entered into in 2011 and runs through the 2030 NFL season. 152
Article 7 of the NFL/NFLPA collective bargaining agreement is
entitled “Rookie Compensation and Rookie Compensation
Pool.”153 For the purposes of this Article, the relevant portions of
Article 7 of the CBA are the “Total Rookie Compensation Pool”
and the “Year-One Rookie Compensation Pool” as explained in
Section 2154 and the “Rookie Contract Length” as explained in
Section 3.155
Section 2 provides: “For the 2020 League Year, Total Rookie
Compensation Pool . . . may not exceed $1,430,000,000 [and] The
Year-One
Rookie
Compensation
Pool . . .
shall
equal
$260,000,000.”156 Section 2 continues with a complicated formula
for computing the increase(s) in the Total Rookie Compensation
Pool and the Year-One Rookie Compensation Pool.157 In addition
to the amount of compensation to be afforded under Section 2,
Section 3 provides:
Every Rookie Contract shall have a fixed and unalterable contract
length: (i) four years for Rookies selected in the first round of the
Draft, with a Club option for a fifth year as described in Section 7
below; (ii) four years for Rookies selected in rounds two through seven
of the Draft (including any compensatory draft selections); and (iii)
three years for Undrafted Rookies.158

The full NFLPA membership vote on the passage of the new
2020 NFL/NFLPA collective bargaining agreement was very
close, passing by a vote of 1,019 to 959.159 The ratification of the
agreement, which was proposed to the players by team owners,
was a hot button topic in the football world and one that divided
players in the league.160 Many in the football community, players
and pundits alike, thought that the players were giving up too
151 See Grant Gordon, NFL player vote ratifies new CBA through 2030 season, NFL
(Mar. 15, 2020, 1:01 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000001106246/article/nflplayer-vote-ratifies-new-cba-through-2030-season [http://perma.cc/5JHV-R9EX].
152 See generally id.
153 Nat’l Football League, supra note 135, at art. 7.
154 Id. at art. 7 § 2.
155 Id. at art. 7 § 3.
156 Id. at art. 7 § 2.
157 Id.
158 Id. at art. 7 § 3.
159 Gordon, supra note 151.
160 See Jordan Heck, NFL CBA vote: Tracking which players are voting ‘yes’ and ‘no’,
SPORTING NEWS (Mar. 11, 2020), http://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/nfl-cba-voteplayers-tracker-yes-no/dqf1q13xwyau1m40illiiattr [http://perma.cc/22G4-X3DE].
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much to the owners—including the addition of a 17th regular
season game—by accepting the very first offer the owners
proposed.161
Despite some significant changes to parts of the collective
bargaining agreement, the structure of the rookie compensation
article in the new 2020 agreement retains the same substantive
information that was included in the 2011 agreement, with the
2020 agreement adding additional language.162 Interestingly,
some of the players who were the most outspoken against the
proposed collective bargaining agreement included established
superstar players such as Russell Wilson, Aaron Rodgers, JJ
Watt, and Richard Sherman, who felt that the players were being
taken advantage of by team owners.163 In a tweet to his followers
indicating his stance on the issue, Russell Wilson drew
comparisons to the NBA and MLB agreements that put the
players first and said that “ALL @NFL players deserve the
same.”164
2. NHL/NHLPA
The most recent collective bargaining agreement between
NHL owners and the NHLPA was ratified on January 12,
2013.165 Much like the NFL/NFLPA agreement, the NHL/NHLPA
agreement places strict guidelines on rookie contracts, or “entry
level” contracts as they are referred to by the NHL.166 Unlike the
NFL, the NHL determines the length of an entry-level contract
based on the player’s age when the contract is signed.167 The
signing age parameters are the same as they have been in the
previous two NHL CBAs: players between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-one are signed for three years; players between the
161 See generally id.; Dan Graziano, NFL CBA approved: What players get in new
deal, how expanded playoffs and schedule will work, ESPN (Mar. 15, 2020),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/28901832/nfl-cba-approved-players-get-new-deal-howexpanded-playoffs-schedule-work [http://perma.cc/9M6U-U6N7].
162 Compare Nat’l Football League, supra note 5, with Nat’l Football League, supra
note 135 at art. 7 (showing that additions were made to the 2020 agreement that were not
present in the 2011, primarily in the form of the calculations used to compute the relevant
figures discussed; dates used in the 2011 agreement were updated to reflect the new time
frame that would be covered by the 2020 agreement and baseline dollar amounts were
updated to reflect the new financial position of the NFL and NFLPA at the time the 2020
agreement was proposed and agreed upon.).
163 Jordan Heck, NFL players think the proposed CBA by owners is awful: 'Rip it up!',
SPORTING NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020), http://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/nfl-playerscba-owners/jcr7tof3e21s15wjh4bqzbo3h [http://perma.cc/LPD4-RZ99].
164 Russell Wilson (@DangeRussWilson), TWITTER (Feb. 26, 2020, 7:16 AM),
http://twitter.com/DangeRussWilson/status/1232685882915872769.
165 Union ratifies new CBA, NHL (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nhl.com/news/unionratifies-new-cba/c-649889 [http://perma.cc/M6XV-JGR6].
166 Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 72, at 23.
167 Id.
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ages of twenty-two and twenty-three are signed for two years;
players who are twenty-four are signed for one year, and players
twenty-five and older are not subject to the entry-level system.168
For age calculation purposes, a player’s age is determined as of
his “age on September 15 of the calendar year in which he signs
[a contract], regardless of his actual age on the date he signs.”169
Unlike the formula used by the NFL/NFLPA, the
NHL/NHLPA collective bargaining agreement allots a set
compensation based on the year the player was drafted, with no
consideration to where in the draft the player was taken. 170
Players drafted in 2005 or 2006 receive $850,000 per year; players
drafted in 2007 or 2008 receive $875,000 per year; players drafted
in 2009 or 2010 receive $900,000 per year, and players drafted
from 2011 to 2022, the entire length that this collective bargaining
agreement covers, will receive $925,000 per year under their
entry-level contract.171
C. Rookie and Entry-Level Players are Not Adequately
Represented
When it comes time to negotiate with the leagues and
their ownership groups on collective bargaining agreements,
players’ associations turn to their leadership: the executive
board and the player representatives from each league team. 172
Every NFL and NHL team elects one player representative to
serve on their respective players’ association. 173 The tables in
Appendix D and Appendix E detail the designated player
representative for each NFL and NHL team, respectively. 174
The column on the far right side of each table indicates the
number of years that the player has been in the league for
purposes of determining if that particular player is on their
rookie, or entry-level, contract.175

Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.
171 Id. at 24–25.
172 See generally Chris Bumbaca, What we know about proposed NFL collective
bargaining agreement, timeline of talks, USA TODAY (Feb. 26 2020, 10:49 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2020/02/26/nfl-collective-bargaining-agreementfacts-deal-details-players-association/4878534002/ [http://perma.cc/S9PG-5PSU].
173 See
Board
of
Player
Representatives,
NFL
PLAYERS’
ASSOC.,
http://www.nflpa.com/about/nflpa-officers#board
[http://perma.cc/X9T7-QMUS]
(last
visited Apr. 10, 2020); see also Executive Board, NHL PLAYERS’ ASSOC.,
http://www.nhlpa.com/the-pa/executive-board [http://perma.cc/9SE9-8YD8] (last visited
Apr. 10, 2020).
174 See infra Appendix D; see also infra Appendix E.
175 See infra Appendix D; see also infra Appendix E.
168
169
170
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NFL teams most recently selected their player
representatives in the fall of 2018.176 Of the players serving as
player representatives for NFL teams, only one of the thirty-two
player representatives—Ronnie Stanley of the Baltimore
Ravens—was playing under the terms of his rookie contract
when he was selected to be a player representative.177 Christian
Wilkins, the youngest player representative in terms of years of
experience, was not yet drafted as a member of the Miami
Dolphins during the last general election for player
representatives,178 but was selected when the original Dolphins
player representative and alternates were traded or released
from the team.179 Of the NHL player representatives, only one of
the thirty-one player representatives—Brady Tkachuk of the
Ottawa Senators—is playing under the terms of his entry-level
contract.180 Although Matt Roy of the Los Angeles Kings is only
in his third season in the NHL, he signed his entry-level contract
at age 22 and thus that contract had a two-year term.181
Both the NFLPA and NHLPA Constitutions codify this
barrier to player representation in their association bylaws. The
NFLPA Constitution requires that “[i]n order to be eligible for
election or temporary appointment as a Player Representative or
Co-Alternate Player Representative, a person must have been a
member in good standing of the NFLPA for at least one (1) year
prior to his election or appointment.”182 The NHLPA Constitution

See Board of Player Representatives, supra note 173.
See infra Appendix D.
Christian Wilkins, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/prospects/christian-wilkins/321957494c08-1088-ad8a-aada01ec7ce9 [http://perma.cc/4WNN-HLA2] (last visited Apr. 17, 2020)
(showing that Wilkins was drafted with the 13th overall pick in the 2019 NFL Draft).
179 See
NFLPA
(@NFLPA),
TWITTER
(Oct.
21,
2018,
9:00
AM),
http://twitter.com/NFLPA/status/1054039680197509121 [http://perma.cc/CA3J-AGVM]; see
also Herbie Teope, Dallas Cowboys trade for Dolphins DE Robert Quinn, NFL (Mar. 28,
2019, 3:28 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/dallas-cowboys-trade-for-dolphins-de-robert-quinn0ap3000001024615 [http://perma.cc/QAF9-LL8K]; see also Josh Alper, Dolphins release Ted
Larsen, Andre Branch, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Mar. 7, 2019, 4:18 PM),
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2019/03/07/dolphins-release-ted-larsen-andre-branch/
[http://perma.cc/NLY6-DXUQ]; see also Kevin Nogle, Dolphins cut John Denney, SB NATION
(Sept. 2, 2019, 10:14 AM), http://www.thephinsider.com/2019/9/2/20844435/dolphins-cutjohn-denney [http://perma.cc/6R45-GQSZ]; see also Kevin Patra, Texans trade for Dolphins’
Laremy
Tunsil,
Kenny
Stills,
NFL
(Aug.
31,
2019,
7:24
AM),
http://www.nfl.com/news/texans-trade-for-dolphins-laremy-tunsil-kenny-stills0ap3000001045889 [http://perma.cc/6FVD-92H4].
180 See infra Appendix E.
181 Matt
Roy,
CAPFRIENDLY,
http://www.capfriendly.com/players/matt-roy
[http://perma.cc/96L3-F5JB] (explaining that Roy’s 2019–20 contract was negotiated
freely by him and his agent).
182 NFL
Players Ass’n Constitution, NFL PLAYERS’ ASS’N (Mar. 2017),
http://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/NFLPAConstitution2017.pdf
[http://perma.cc/CL5Y-ZPCY].
176
177
178
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takes this even further by requiring that player representatives
must “have been on an NHL Club roster for at least 160 games.”183
The discrepancy in the years of experience is undoubtedly
apparent when it comes to the bargaining tables and the
collective bargaining agreements that result therefrom. As was
discussed in Part II.B, the salary cap structure of the NFL and
the NHL exists to promote parity in the leagues and to avoid the
wealthier teams from overspending.184 With that limiting number
in mind, there is only a finite amount of money that teams are
permitted to spend. Limiting the compensation that is permitted
to be paid to players entering the league guarantees that there is
a higher percentage of the salary cap to be had by the veteran
players. Without equality of representation on either the player
representative staff or the association executive boards, there are
no incentives for the interests of the continuous stream of
incoming talent. To be certain, those that serve as veterans
realize the inequality that they had to overcome as rookies, and
now that they are in a more preferential position, they are
certainly not going to give up less of their own rights to benefit
the incoming class. Inevitably, that cycle repeats itself in
perpetuity.
D. Unequal Position Runs Afoul of Policy Concerns Behind the
Passage of the NLRA
Ingrained in the passage of the NLRA were underlying policy
concerns that justify such action.185 In enacting the NLRA,
Congress realized that inherent differences in the “bargaining
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of
association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce . . . by depressing wage rates.”186 It was well
understood that protecting employees’ rights to organize was
important to the commerce and the hopes of resolving disputes
that arose between employers and employees.187

183 Constitution of the Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE
PLAYERS’
ASS’N,
http://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/Leagu
e%20Constitutions%20&%20Bylaws/nhlpa_constitution.pdf [http://perma.cc/NR76-LWBZ]
(last visited May 4, 2020).
184 See Collective Bargaining Agreements in Sports, supra note 38.
185 See 29 U.S.C. §151 (2018).
186 Id.
187 See id.
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The policy concerns were not solely limited to protection of
employees but included protection from unwanted practices by
unions.188 In realizing that labor unions could take damaging
action like employers, it was said:
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some
labor organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing
the free flow of goods in such commerce through . . . concerted
activities which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of
such commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary
condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed. It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce.189

However, despite these issues being plainly obvious over
eighty years ago, it is these very practices that are rearing their
heads today and causing the exact havoc that was sought to be
eliminated. The NFLPA and NHLPA, through their
representation comprised almost entirely of veteran players no
longer concerned with the plight of the rookie, have engaged in
practices that have the “effect of burdening or obstructing
commerce” by preventing the free flow of goods—in this context,
players services—through their unreasonable control of rookie
salaries.190 The plain language of the NLRA indicating the policy
justifications for a lack of “obstructions to the free flow of
commerce” can certainly be found to extend to services where
those services themselves form the basis of the commerce in
question.191
IV. GOOD FAITH BARGAINING AND FAIR REPRESENTATION FOR ALL
In order for there to be true pay equity in these professional
sports leagues, the arbitrary maximum cap placed on rookie or
entry-level contracts must be abolished. This Article proposes
that any restrictions on rookie or entry-level contract earnings be
abolished in any new collective bargaining agreements moving
forward. This is not to suggest that every rookie or entry-level
player should be making comparable salaries to those proven
veterans, but rather that they have the ability to do so and are
not otherwise unduly burdened by a blanket cap on their
contracts merely based on their tenure status.

188
189
190
191

See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See generally id.
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This Article is hardly the first to propose that the rookie
wage structure, as it is currently structured, needs re-working.192
The rookie wage structure that is now in place has been called
“an overcorrection to how incoming players were previously
compensated.”193 It has previously been suggested that the
amount of time an NFL player is under his rookie contract can be
shortened by one year—moving from five years to four years for
first-round picks, from four to three years for other draftees, and
from three to two years for undrafted players.194 Under previous
proposals, players would be able to renegotiate their rookie
contracts one year earlier and the negotiation window would
open following the second year of the contract, as opposed to the
third.195 However, these minor tweaks to an already-broken
system do not adequately fix the problem and also discount the
tremendous success that players on rookie or entry-level
contracts are having in recent years.
The NFL’s role in this rookie wage problem is two-fold. First,
the discussion in Part III.A above shows that there appears to be
a very strong case that college athletes or other prospective NFL
players are in fact not members of the NFLPA. This would
appear to open the possibility that antitrust claims, potentially
brought by the prospective players, would not be protected by the
non-statutory labor exemption, based on the tests that circuit
courts have developed in past opinions. Second, and
alternatively, if the prospective players are deemed to be subject
to the conditions of the CBA, the disparate treatment that they
receive by virtue of being a new player in the league should be a
ripe scenario for a duty of fair representation claim with the
NLRB. The NFLPA is far from a bargaining unit that is above
reproach and a recent claim by current NFL player Russell
Okung accuses NFLPA Executive Director DeMaurice Smith
with making threats of retaliation regarding players being
outspoken against the recently ratified 2020 NFL/NFLPA
CBA.196

192 See generally Corry, supra note 139; Joel Corry, Agent’s Take: Here’s how the NFL
would look if the rookie wage scale didn’t exist, CBS Sports (Apr. 24, 2018, 7:00 AM),
http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/agents-take-heres-how-the-nfl-would-look-if-therookie-wage-scale-didnt-exist/ [http://perma.cc/UQF4-B33W].
193 Corry, supra note 192.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See Gregg E. Clifton, NFL Players Association Executive Committee Member Files
ULP Against Own Union and Its Leaders, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 10, 2020),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/nfl-players-association-executive-committeemember-files-ulp-against-own-union-and [http://perma.cc/Q475-AP7X].
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Young NFL and NHL players entering the league are not
given adequate representation to ensure that their needs have a
fair shot of being met and, in fact, history has provided us with
examples of the exact opposite: player representatives are
explicitly outspoken in their desire to throttle down the earning
capacity of select members of the group they are elected to
represent, merely because they are new to the league.197 This is
quite clearly a breach of the duty of fair representation and the
“statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members
without hostility or discrimination toward any.”198 Instead of
focusing on pumping up veteran players and their salaries by
evidencing how they have proven themselves, the NFLPA and
NHLPA seem intent on bringing rookie compensation down in a
manner akin to the “cycles of abuse” of hazing where “members
model for new members the accepted methods for initiation”
which—in this scenario—is artificially throttled salaries.199
Whatever the initial reasons or justifications for the rookie
salaries in both the NFL and NHL, there are even stronger
arguments for its removal. Rookie players are enjoying
tremendous success in recent years, winning awards for both
league200 and Super Bowl most valuable player honors. 201 One
need look no further than MLB for a sports world example with
no maximum rookie contracts.202 MLB, as mentioned earlier in
this Article, does not have a hard salary cap and there is also no

197 See Mawae: Big Rookie Contracts Like Ryans’ ‘Disheartening’, supra note 83; see
generally Liz Mullen, The making of a union, SPORTS BUS. J. (Jan. 23, 2017),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2017/01/23/Labor-andAgents/NHLPA.aspx [http://perma.cc/9T6R-BX24].
198 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
199 Why
do
groups
haze
members?,
ELON
U.,
http://www.elon.edu/u/hazing/facts/theories-research/ [http://perma.cc/D8MC-6QCZ] (last
visited Apr. 29, 2020).
200 AP
NFL Most Valuable Player Winners, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE,
http://www.pro-football-reference.com/awards/ap-nfl-mvp-award.htm
[http://perma.cc/96MY-UYRU] (last visited May 4, 2020) (showing that Cam Newton in
2015, Patrick Mahomes in 2018 and Lamar Jackson in 2019 were all on their rookie
contracts when they were voted most valuable player); see also NHL Hart Memorial
Trophy
Winners,
HOCKEY
REFERENCE,
http://www.hockeyreference.com/awards/hart.html [http://perma.cc/B4MQ-DAX9] (last visited May 4, 2020)
(showing that Sidney Crosby in 2006–07 and Connor McDavid in 2016–17 were on their
entry-level contracts when they won the Hart Memorial Trophy for NHL most valuable
player).
201 NFL
History
–
Super
Bowl
MVPs,
ESPN,
http://www.espn.com/nfl/superbowl/history/mvps
[http://perma.cc/6F2F-LAXN]
(last
visited May 4, 2020) (stating that Von Miller in Super Bowl 50 and Patrick Mahomes in
Super Bowl LIV were on their rookie contracts when they were awarded Super Bowl most
valuable player).
202 See Andrew Brandt, The Differences in Rookie Contracts, NAT’L FOOTBALL POST,
http://nationalfootballpost.com/the-differences-in-rookie-contracts/
[http://perma.cc/5YHW-LW8U] (last visited May 1, 2020).

Do Not Delete

330

5/17/2021 9:05 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:1

limit on the amount that teams are permitted to pay their
incoming players.203 Instead, the MLB league office provides
clubs with recommendations for signing bonuses and overall
compensation for rookies.204 These figures are merely suggestions
that teams can choose to follow or not, but this format does
provide for highly-talented players entering the league to have a
fighting chance to earn themselves appropriate money right off
the bat.205 It is the “truest free-market application to [the]
selection process, giving players at the top leverage (whether real
or perceived) to negotiate without any of the parameters imposed
by the [rookie] caps of the other sports.”206
A related industry for comparison to professional athletes is
the television and film industry. Here, like in professional sports,
the most in-demand talent can be of any age and it is not
uncommon for younger talent to be wildly successful, sometimes
even more so than individuals that have been in the business for
longer periods of time. These television and film personalities are
represented by the Screen Actors Guild – American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists (“SAG-AFTRA”).207 SAG-AFTRA is
the unionized representative body of “approximately 160,000
actors, announcers . . . and other media professionals.”208 The
union is responsible for “negotiating the best wages, working
conditions and health and pension” benefits for its members.209
Those in charge of movies and television shows are very familiar
with the salary cap-like implications of their projects: working talent
salaries under budgets. While the comparison is not completely
apples-to-apples, there is a logical nexus between the salary caps in
sports and the budgets that film and television producers must work
under.210 The sums of money paid to television and film
talent—including a specialized film industry salary that involves a
portion of the profits of a film—is said to be “Hollywood’s version of a
salary cap.”211 Similar to sports contracts, there are a number of
See id.
See id.
205 See id.
206 Id.
207 About, SAG-AFTRA, http://www.sagaftra.org/about [http://perma.cc/8EAL-52CB]
(last visited Apr. 17, 2020).
208 Id.
209 SAG-AFTRA, Constitution of the Screen Actors Guild – American Federation of
Television
and
Radio
Artists,
1
(Oct.
11,
2019),
https://www.sagaftra.org/files/sa_documents/2019%20Constitution%20%20Updated%20Rules%202020%201214.pdf [http://perma.cc/N7Z8-4Z5F].
210 Tim Ryan, Who’s who on a film set?, TAR PROD., http://tarproductions.com/whoswho-on-a-film-set/ [http://perma.cc/D4RU-AQGG] (last visited May 4, 2020).
211 John Horn, Hollywood Studios Rewriting Pay System for Their Talent, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 13, 2006), http://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-jan-13-fi-gross13-story.html
[http://perma.cc/955S-CTHZ].
203
204

Do Not Delete

2020]

5/17/2021 9:05 AM

Unsportsmanlike Conduct

331

additional benefits that can be negotiated into an actor’s contract.212
Much like securing a top-end sports talent can favor a franchise on
the field or at the gate, “[s]ecuring a proven movie star is one way to
guarantee ticket sales.”213
One major difference between SAG-AFTRA and the
NFL/NFLPA and NHL/NHLPA collective bargaining agreements
deals with compensation. Article XI of the SAG-AFTRA
Constitution deals with collective bargaining.214 Despite the fact
that SAG-AFTRA represents union members that must abide by
the financial restrictions imposed by television and film budgets,
there is a provision in the union constitution that explicitly
prevents the union from artificially capping the amount of money
to be made by a member: Subsection D Article XI states that
“[t]he Union shall not negotiate or seek to regulate the maximum
compensation that may be earned by any member under any
collective bargaining agreement.”215 This is in direct contrast to
what is present in both the NFL/NFLPA and NHL/NHLPA
collective bargaining agreements.216 Similar to television and film
budgets that may vary from project to project, the NFL and NHL
agreements are both silent on the exact salary cap figure on a
year-to-year basis.217 However, these agreements both
specifically limit what certain members of their respective
unions—rookies or entry-level players—are permitted to make,218
while providing minimum amounts that preferred members of
their unions—veteran members—are required to make.219
An ancillary benefit of allowing rookie or entry-level
compensation to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis allows the
players to account for income tax considerations.220 Tax
implications are a necessary evil of all professional sports
contracts, but mandating that players be required to earn a
predetermined amount, regardless of location, does an injustice
212 Margaret Heidenry, How Hollywood Salaries Really Work, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 12,
2018), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2018/02/hollywood-movie-salaries-wage-gapequality [http://perma.cc/LD8T-TV4P].
213 Id.
214 SAG-AFTRA, supra note 209, at 37.
215 Id. at 38.
216 See generally Nat’l Football League, supra note 135; Nat’l Hockey League, supra
note 72.
217 See Nat’l Football League, supra note 135, at art. 13; Nat’l Hockey League, supra
note 72, at art. 50.
218 See Nat’l Football League, supra note 135, at art. 7; Nat’l Hockey League, supra
note 72, at art. 9.
219 See Nat’l Football League, supra note 135, at art. 9; Nat’l Hockey League, supra
note 72, at art. 10.
220 Jeff Bowes, Major Penalty for High Taxes, AMS. FOR TAX REFORM 20 (Sept. 2015),
http://www.taxpayer.com/media/MajorPenalty-October2015.pdf
[http://perma.cc/PH9NY6LZ].
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to those players who play for teams in states with higher state
income tax. For example, taking the CBA-mandated $925,000
entry-level salary for an NHL player drafted in the 2019 NHL
Draft, a player drafted to one of the league’s three California
based teams—the Anaheim Ducks, the Los Angeles Kings, or the
San Jose Sharks—would pay a top marginal tax rate of 13.3%221
and an effective tax rate of roughly 10.6%.222 When these figures
are contrasted to states like Florida, Nevada, and Texas—all of
which have NHL teams that have no state income tax—it is
calculated that playing in a low or no-tax state can effectively
save players that play in those states up to $90,000 per year. The
actual computation of an athlete’s tax return is much more
convoluted than this brief example as athletes must generally file
taxes in each state in which they work throughout the year.223
Nevertheless, the amount an athlete saves in taxes from playing
a majority of their games in a low state-tax state is far from
negligible and certainly comes into play when veteran free agents
consider signing subsequent contracts with teams.224 Under the
proposal that this Article proffers, a player who was selected to
play for a team in a state with a higher tax rate would be able to
factor that into his—and his agent’s—negotiations with a team so
that the player was not at a disadvantage relative to his peers in
lower-rate states.
Simply put, the proposal that rookie or entry-level contracts
should not have an artificially imposed maximum on them forces
the team owners to be businessmen and make good business
deals. With some, if not most, NFL and NHL owners’ net worth
being measured in billions as opposed to millions, making good
business deals is not out of the question for them. Allowing
players the opportunity to earn more than a prescribed
maximum does not mean that owners will be forced to empty
their bank accounts for unproven rookies each and every time, it
merely affords the players who are worth more to earn their fair

221 See Katherin Loughead, State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2021
at 6, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 2021), http://files.taxfoundation.org/20210217114725/StateIndividual-Income-Tax-Rates-and-Brackets-for-2021.pdf [http://perma.cc/HP7Z-MKG5].
222 See,
e.g.,
California
Income
Tax
Calculator,
SMARTASSET,
http://smartasset.com/taxes/california-tax-calculator [http://perma.cc/P4FN-A872] (last
visited May 6, 2020).
223 See generally John Calvin, Itching for the Jock Tax, AM. SPECTATOR (June 1, 2016,
12:00 AM), http://spectator.org/itching-for-the-jock-tax/ [http://perma.cc/N2PT-J64G]. This
brief tax calculation does not take into account any standard or itemized deductions that
might be available to the athlete or if they file jointly with a spouse.
224 See generally Bowes, supra note 220; Ryan Lake, Mark Stone Hit The Tax Jackpot
With Trade To Vegas Golden Knights, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2019, 9:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanlake/2019/03/07/mark-stone-hits-the-tax-jackpot-invegas/#6842267c748c [http://perma.cc/DS4G-NUKA].
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share faster. In turn, this leads to increased player satisfaction
and loyalty, increased productivity on the field of play, and a
better feel for fans of the team who do not have to witness their
favorite player sitting out. Allowing young players their shot to
earn a fair salary ultimately benefits all interested parties.
V. CONCLUSION
Professional athletes have a finite amount of time to cash in
on the earning potential that they spent their entire lifetime
building. With the developments of modern medicine giving us a
glimpse into just how much damage these young men do to their
bodies, it is more important than ever that athletes utilize the
very limited time they have to the fullest. Rookie or entry-level
players that are forced to take less than fair-market value for
their services while they earn their places in the league is a
disservice to the blood, sweat, and tears that professional
athletes put into their careers. The barriers to entry to a career
in professional sports are some of the highest in North America
on their own, and these barriers should not be made artificially
higher due to players’ associations negotiating in bad faith and
not fairly representing a certain class of members in their
unions.
Although recent holdouts have been met with mixed results
from critics,225 it is clear that the players who make the
calculated risk to sit out for days, weeks, or months at a time are
doing so with the notion that the value of services they provide to
their respective teams is vastly underappreciated by ownership.
Simply put, these players deserve better. They deserve better
from team owners and they especially deserve better from their
players’ associations—the very people that are supposed to be in
their corner, fighting for their best interests.

225 Compare Jesse Washington, Le’Veon Bell is smarter than you think, UNDEFEATED
(Nov. 14, 2018), http://theundefeated.com/features/leveon-bell-pittsburgh-steelers-issmarter-than-you-think/ [http://perma.cc/9V7W-KZHE], with Mike Tanier, Le’Veon Bell’s
Holdout Has Become a Historic Disaster…for Le’Veon Bell, BLEACHER REP. (Nov. 6, 2018),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2804597-leveon-bells-holdout-has-become-a-historicdisasterfor-leveon-bell [http://perma.cc/8PUQ-8SWH].
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Appendix A
Salary Inequality and Parity Comparison in Major Professional Sports226
League

“Fairness Metric” Rank

“Fairness Metric”
Raw Ratio

NFL 227

5 of 18

1.38:1

NBA228

6 of 18

1.98:1

NHL229

7 of 18

2.30:1

MLB 230

9 of 18

3.53:1

Premier League (England)231

12 of 18

6.82:1

Serie A (Italy) 232

13 of 18

16:1

La Liga (Spain) 233

15 of 18

19:1

Bundesliga (Germany) 234

16 of 18

20.5:1

Ligue 1 (France)235

18 of 18

26.6:1

226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235

See generally Global Sports Salaries Survey 2018, supra note 51.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 78.
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Appendix B
1995 NHL CBA Entry-Level Compensation by Draft Year236
Draft Year

NHL Compensation

1995

US$ 850,000

1996

US$ 875,000

1997

US$ 925,000

1998

US$ 975,000

1999

US$ 1,025,000

2000

US$ 1,075,000

2001

US$ 1,130,000

2002

US$ 1,185,000

2003

US$ 1,240,000

2004

US$ 1,295,000

Appendix C
2005 NHL CBA Entry-Level Compensation by Draft Year237
Draft Year

NHL Compensation

2005

US$ 850,000

2006

US$ 850,000

2007

US$ 875,000

2008

US$ 875,000

2009

US$ 900,000

2010

US$ 900,000

2011

US$ 925,000

2012238

US$ 925,000

Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 85, at art. 9.3(a).
Nat’l Hockey League, supra note 94, at art. 9.3(a).
238 Id. (“If the NHLPA exercises its right to extend this Agreement until 2012, the
maximum annual aggregate Paragraph 1 NHL Salary . . . shall be U.S. $925,000.”).
236
237
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Appendix D239
NFLPA Player Representatives
Team

Player Representative

Years in League240

Arizona Cardinals

Corey Peters

10 years

Atlanta Falcons

Josh Harris

8 years

Baltimore Ravens

Ronnie Stanley

4 years

Buffalo Bills

Patrick DiMarco

8 years

Carolina Panthers

Greg Van Roten

8 years

Chicago Bears

Chase Daniel

10 years

Cincinnati Bengals

Geno Atkins

10 years

Cleveland Browns

Jarvis Landry

6 years

Dallas Cowboys

Byron Jones

5 years

Denver Broncos

Brandon McManus

6 years

Detroit Lions

Devon Kennard

6 years

Green Bay Packers

Aaron Rodgers

15 years

Houston Texans

Brennan Scarlett

4 years

Indianapolis Colts

Clayton Geathers

5 years

Jacksonville Jaguars

Calais

Campbell241

12 years

Kansas City Chiefs

Dustin Colquitt

15 years

Las Vegas Raiders

Rodney Hudson

9 years

Los Angeles Chargers

Mike Pouncey

9 years

Los Angeles Rams

Todd Gurley 242

5 years

Miami Dolphins

Christian Wilkins

1 year

Minnesota Vikings

Adam Thielen

6 years

New England Patriots

Matt Slater

12 years

New Orleans Saints

Craig Robertson

8 years

New York Giants

Nate Solder

9 years

New York Jets

Quincy Enunwa

6 years

Philadelphia Eagles

Malcolm Jenkins

11 years

Board of Player Representatives, supra note 173.
See, e.g., 2020 NFL Players, FOX SPORTS (last visited May 16, 2020),
http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/players [http://perma.cc/P9NJ-XB46] (showing experience
calculations conducted by the author accurate as of the conclusion of the 2019 NFL
season).
241 See Nick Shook, Jaguars to trade DE Calais Campbell to Ravens, NFL (Mar. 15,
2020, 2:38 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/jaguars-to-trade-de-calais-campbell-to-ravens0ap3000001106265 [http://perma.cc/ETF7-SNFZ].
242 See Kevin Patra, Rams release former OPOY, standout Todd Gurley, NFL (Mar.
19, 2020, 5:48 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/rams-release-former-opoy-standout-toddgurley-0ap3000001107050 [http://perma.cc/9MH4-XDV5].
239
240
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Pittsburgh Steelers

Ramon Foster

11 years

San Francisco 49ers

Richard Sherman

9 years

Seattle Seahawks

K.J. Wright

9 years

Tampa Bay Buccaneers

Ali Marpet

5 years

Tennessee Titans

Wesley Woodyard

12 years

Washington Redskins

Nick Sundberg

10 years
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Appendix E243
NHLPA Player Representatives
Team
Anaheim Ducks

Player Representative

Years in League244

Josh Manson

6 years

Arizona Coyotes

Derek Stepan

10 years

Boston Bruins

Brandon Carlo

4 years

Buffalo Sabres

Jake McCabe

7 years

Calgary Flames

Mikael Backlund

11 years

Carolina Hurricanes

Jordan Martinook

8 years

Chicago Blackhawks

Jonathan Toews

13 years

Colorado Avalanche

Ian Cole

10 years

Columbus Blue Jackets

David Savard

10 years

Dallas Stars

Jason Dickinson

5 years

Detroit Red Wings

Luke Glendening

7 years

Edmonton Oilers

Darnell Nurse

5 years

Florida Panthers

Michael Matheson

5 years

Los Angeles Kings

Matt Roy

3 years

Minnesota Wild

Devan Dubnyk

11 years

Montreal Canadiens

Paul Byron

11 years

Nashville Predators

Yannick Weber

12 years

New Jersey Devils

Kyle Palmieri

10 years

New York Islanders

Anders Lee

8 years

New York Rangers

Jacob Trouba

7 years

Ottawa Senators

Brady Tkachuk

2 years

Philadelphia Flyers

James Van Riemsdyk

11 years

Pittsburgh Penguins

Kristopher Letang

13 years

San Jose Sharks

Logan Couture

11 years

St. Louis Blues

Colton Parayko

5 years

Tampa Bay Lightning

Alexander Killorn

8 years

Toronto Maple Leafs

Zach Hyman

5 years

Vancouver Canucks

Bo Horvat

6 years

Vegas Golden Knights

Nate Schmidt

8 years

Washington Capitals

Thomas Wilson

7 years

Winnipeg Jets

Adam Lowry

7 years

Executive Board, supra note 173.
CAPFRIENDLY, http://www.capfriendly.com [http://perma.cc/W5VA-CBNT] (last visited Apr. 1,
2020). At the time of this writing, the 2019–20 NHL season was on hiatus due to the COVID-19
pandemic. Years of experience data accurate counting the 2019–20 season as a full year.
243
244

